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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S. 
PAGE, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8815 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought in the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Utah by the plaintiffs-respondents against the 
defendant-appellant, Federal Security Insurance Company, 
seeking to recover the face amount of an insurance policy in 
the amount of $11,682.00, which policy was issued by the 
defendant on the life of Alma M. Page on the 15th day of 
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December, 1950, with Meredith Page, father of the insured 
and one of the plaintiffs herein, named as beneficiary thereon, 
the insured, Alma M. Page, having died on or about the 14th 
day of August, 1956. 
The defendant-appellant filed its answer alleging that the 
insured, Alma M. Page, prior to his death, elected under the 
terms of the policy, "Option (B) Reduced Paid-Up Life In-
surance", in the sum of $1443.00. 
The matter was heard by the court, sitting with a jury. At 
the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the defendant made a motion 
for a directed verdict, which motion was denied by the court. 
On the 12th day of December, 1957, the jury found in favor 
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. 
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion for a 
new trial, which motions were, on the 3rd day of January, 
1958, denied by the court. 
On the 14th day of January, 1958, notice of appeal was 
filed and served by the defendant-appellant, and the cause is 
now before the court for review. 
This action arose from the following transactions, to-wit: 
Alma M. Page, on the 6th day of December, 1950, made 
an application in writing to the Federal Security Insurance 
Company for an insurance policy ~nown and designated as 
"Bonus Policy, Participating 20 Payment Life" in the face 
amount of $11,682.00, which policy was issued on the 15th day 
of December, 1950. 
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The insured was then 24 years of age and unmarried, but 
on or about the 24th day of February, 1954, he was married to 
Ruth Jensen, now surviving him. The references made through-
out this brief to "Ruth Jensen Page" are to the widow of the 
insured. 
The premium on the policy of insurance was $400.00 a 
year, payable on the 15th day of December, each and every 
year. The premiums were paid on said policy, either by cash 
or policy loan, from 1950 through December 15, 1954, thus 
keeping the policy in force until December 15, 1955. 
The policy in question is profit sharing, the insured being 
entitled to dividends at the end of the second year, as provided 
in the rider attached to said policy, and likewise provides for 
cash values. 
Mr. Erich Olschewski, referred to hereafter as "Erich" 
or "Mr. Olschewski," was, at the times mentioned herein, the 
assistant secretary of the defendant, Federal Security Insurance 
Company. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Did the insured, Alma M. Page, prior to his death, 
deliver his insurance policy to the company? 
2. As the policy of insurance does not require the exercising 
of the options under the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy 
to be in writing, an oral election is sufficient under the law to 
effectuate a valid election. 
3. Did the insured intend to elect one of the options under 
the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy, prior to his death? 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. Did the insured, Alma M. Page, prior to his death, elect 
"Option (B) Reduced Paid-Up Life Insurance," under the 
non-forfeiture provisions of the policy in question? 
5. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict. 
6. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
7. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for 
a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DID THE INSURED, ALMA M. PAGE, PRIOR TO HIS 
DEATH, DELIVER HIS INSURANCE POLICY TO THE 
COMPANY? 
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, widow of the insured, 
and of other witnesses established that the insured and 
his wife on two occasions visited the home office of the de-
fendant company, Federal Security Insurance Company. The 
testimony of Ruth Jensen Page clearly points out that her hus· 
band, during his lifetime, did deliver to the defendant his life 
insurance policy. 
In speaking of the second visit made by herself and her 
husband to the company offices, Mrs. Page testified: 
"Q. A paid-up insurance. Now while you were there, 
did you have the insurance policy with you? 
A. Back home? 
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Q. No, at the office? 
A. Yes. We had it with us. 
Q. You had it, and what did you do with it? 
A. Erich kept it as far as I remember." 
R. 24 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 10, a letter obtained from Ruth 
Jensen Page at the time her deposition was taken, and intro-
duced into evidence at the trial, states without . qualification 
the whereabouts of the policy of insurance on the 3rd day of 
August, 1955. This exhibit is set forth in full on pages 35 & 36 
of this brief. The last paragraph states: 
"We shall continue to hold your policy in our pos-
session until we hear from you." 
Def's Exhibit No. 10, Ltr 
dtd Aug. 3, 1955, from 
Defendant to Alma M. Page 
Under direct examination, Mr. Erich Olschewski, in ~peak­
ing of the visits made to the company offices by the insured 
and his wife, testified: 
"Q. What did you talk about? 
A. As a result of this letter, I might first of all state 
they had left the policy with me and asked me to 
give them a letter explaining the various things I 
recommended for them and upon receipt of that 
letter in due time, they came back to give me their 
decision.'' 
R. 37 
In the direct examination of Mr. Olschewski with regard 
to Exhibit No. 10, the record shows: 
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"Q. Now, I show you what has been marked as defend-
ant's Exhibit 10 and ask you whether you have ever 
seen that before? 
A. Would you restate that please? 
Q. I was asking you if you have ever seen it before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does it bear your signature? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Do you know who dictated the letter? 
A. I did. 
Q. After you dictated it, what did you do? 
MR. COTRO MANES: Will you stipulate that it 
mailed and received? 
MR. RONNOW: Yes." 
R. 36 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 12, which was introduced into 
evidence, and which is set forth in full on page 3 7 of this 
brief, again states that the defendant had in its possession the 
insurance policy of Alma M. Page. The first paragraph of this 
exhibit, the carbon copy of a letter from the defendant to 
Alma M. Page, states: 
··In accordance with your election when in the office 
on August 8, we return herewith your policy No. 20 
PLB 3lOL" Defs Exhibit No. 12, Ltr 
dtd Aug. 15, 1955, from 
Defendant to Alma M. Page 
The insurance policy mentioned by number in this exhibit 
10 
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is the same numbered policy as the one introduced by the plain~ 
tiffs as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1. 
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, with regard to the 
return of the insurance policy by the defendant to herself and 
her husband, shows: 
"Q. Now, after the insurance policy came back from 
the insurance company, 
MR. BUSHNELL: It has not been established whether 
the policy came back from the insurance company. 
A. The policy came back. 
MR. BUSHNELL: I withdraw my objection." 
R.27 
The testimony of Merle Thomas Olschewski, Erich Ols-
chewski' s secretary at the time in question, shows that she had 
the policy in her possession and affixed thereto the rider re~ 
clueing the policy to paid-up life insurance, and mailed it back 
to the insured. 
"Q. I show you what has been received into evidence, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, and ask you to examine it and 
say whether you have ever seen it before? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Did you attach, then, the rider to that policy? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you do then? 
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The only evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to reb1 
the fact that the deceased Alma M. Page surrendered his poli, 
to the insurance company for endorsement was the testimon 
of the plaintiff, Meredith M. Page, who, under cross examim 
tion, testified: 
"Q. All right, you stated a minute ago that you have, 
strong box at your home, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that the policy has been inside that box ever 
since it was issued? 
A. That is right. 
Q. All this time the policy was in this box? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever give it to your son? 
A. I have never given it to my son." 
R. 102 
Considering Defendant's Exhibits 10 and 12, the testi· 
mony of the insured's widow, Ruth Jensen Page, and the testi· 
mony of the defendant's employees, Mr. and Mrs. Olschewski, 
there is an overwhelming preponderance of evidence that this 
policy was in fact delivered to the insurance company by the 
insured and likewise that it was returned by the company to 
the insured. 
These facts were not controverted. The plaintiffs at no 
time alleged or plead that Exhibits 10 or 12 were fraudulent. 
··Fraud is a matter to be established by clear and 
12 
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convincing proof . . . Its existence should never rest 
upon mere suspicion or surmise." 
Shaw v. Board of Education, 
38 N. M. 298, 31 P. 2d 993, 
93 A. L. R. 432, 439. 
"Where fraud is charged, it must affirmatively be 
proved by clear and convincing testimony. It cannot 
be established upon mere suspicion." 
Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire 
Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N. E. 420, 
98 A.L.R. 169, 180 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The plaintiffs did not object to the introduction of Exhibit 
10 (R. 90). They did object to the introduction of Exhibit 
12 on the grounds that it was not shown that the letter was 
ever received by Alma M. Page. The court ruled that this was 
correct, but allowed the exhibit to be introduced (R. 87). 
It is contended that the testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, 
widow of the insured, did show that the letter had in fact 
been received. 
"Q. I'll show you what has been marked defendant's 
Exhibit 12 and ask you to read that and tell me 
whether or not you have ever seen the original of 
that letter? 
A. I'm afraid I didn't read it too well if we did get it. 
Q. Well, did you ever see a letter like that? 
A. Do I have to say yes or no? 
Q. Yes, if you did see it or didn't we want the truth. 
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On cross examination by plaintiff's counsel, Mrs. Page 
testified: 
"Q. Do you remember honestly reading or receiving 
the Exhibit which is marked No. 12? 
A. As I said, not the wordings, but I remember talking 
that it was fixed the way we wanted it when the 
policy came back. 
Q. Do you recall whether you said you read it or did 
your husband read it? 
A. I believe we read it together." 
R. 29 
Mrs. Merle Olschewski testified that she transcribed 
Exhibit 12 from her shorthand notes, typed it on letterhead 
stationery, gave it to Mr. Olschewski for signing, and there-
after placed the letter in the envelope with the policy of 
insurance, sealed the letter in the envelope with the policy 
of insurance, stamped the envelope and mailed it to the insured, 
Alma M. Page, (R. 85, 86). She was not cross-examined by 
plaintiffs' counsel. 
"It is generally recognized that a presumption of 
the due receipt of a letter or of a communication 
through the mails arises upon proof that such letter 
or communication properly addressed to the addressee 
and properly stamped with sufficient postage thereon 
was mailed . . . '' 
20 Am Jur 196, Evidence, Sec. 196, 
citing Utah case of Campbell v. 
Gowans, 25 U. 268, 100 P. 397. 
With the exception of the statement by Mr. Meredith 
14 
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Page, one of the plaintiffs herein, to the effect that he never 
gave his son, Alma Page, the insured, the insurance policy 
and that the policy was in •the strong box continuously from 
the time it was issued until after his son's death, all evidence 
showed that the policy was in fact possessed by the insured, 
Alma M. Page, who left it at the company offices with Mr. 
Olschewski. Three witnesses and two written documents 
substantiate this fact, as opposed to the statement of the plain-
tiff, Meredith. 
"While a jury may not arbitrarily disbelieve a witness 
and reject his testimony, neither are they bound to ac-
cept a fact as established merely because he testifies 
to it, when the circumstances render its existence, or 
the testimony of the witness, improbable or doubtful." 
Leavitt v. Thurston, 
38 U. 351, 113 P. 77. 
" ... the documentary proof, if inconsistent with the 
oral testimony, is controlling ... " 
Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 
148 F. 2d 128 (7th Cir. 1945). 
POINT TWO 
AS THE POLICY OF INSURANCE DOES NOT RE-
QUIRE THE EXERCISING OF THE OPTIONS UNDER 
THE NON-FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY 
TO BE IN WRITING, AN ORAL ELECTION IS SUFFI-
CIENT UNDER THE LAW TO EFFECTUATE A VALID 
ELECTION. 
The insurance policy m question, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, 
l5 
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specifically spells out the necessity of written requests by the 
insured to effectuate certain changes under the policy,. that is: 
(a) change of beneficiary, (b) request for automatic premium 
loan privilege, (c) revocation of automatic premium loan 
privilege. 
The contract is silent as to the necessity of a written 
request for the election of any of the options known as Options 
A, B, and C. Thus, where the contract is silent as to· the neces-
sity of a written election, the court cannot insert or read· into 
the option provision the word, ''written.'' 
''An insurance contract must be construed without 
disregarding words or clauses used, or inserting words 
or clauses not used." 
29 Am Jur 173, Insurance, Sec. 157 
"The court has no power to interpolate into the 
agreement between an insurer and the insured a con-
dition or stipulation not contemplated either by law 
or by the contract between the parties." 
29 Am Jur 173, 174 
Insurance, Sec. 15 7 
The contract of insurance is not ambiguous and therefore 
the courts are bound to interpret it as written. 
· · . . . and as there is no ambiguity in the contract, 
it must be given effect as written. As has often been 
said, 'Courts are without authority to rewrite con-
tracts'." Citing cases. 
Summers v. Travelers Insurance Co., 
109 F. 2d 845 (8th cir. 1940) 
127 A.L.R. 1336. 
The options given the insured are for his benefit and the 
16 
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exercising of the options are with him; and where it is not 
required that written acceptance of the option be made, then 
in that event an oral acceptance is sufficient. 
" . . . a verbal acceptance of an option is sufficient 
when the option does not require a written acceptance." 
12 Am Jur 5 34, Contracts, Sec. 39 
POINT THREE 
DID THE INSURED INTEND TO ELECT ONE OF 
THE OPTIONS UNDER THE NON-FORFEITURE PRO-
VISIONS OF THE POLICY, PRIOR TO HIS DEATH? 
The testimony of the widow, Ruth Jensen Page, established 
that the motive of the insured and herself in going to the 
insurance company offices was to discontinue the policy as a 
$400.00 per year premium payable insurance contract. On 
direct examination in regard to the visits made to the company 
offices by herself and the insured, Mrs. Page testified: 
"Q. What did you and your husband go there for? 
A. To have our policy discontinued. 
Q. To have your policy discontinued? 
A. We didn't want it any more. We wanted it as a paid 
up insurance." 
R. 21 
On cross-examination regarding these visits to the com-
pany offices, Mrs. Page testified: 
"Q. Let me ask you, did I understand your testimony 
correctly-you went in and arranged so that you 
would not have to make any more payments? 
1 7 
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A. We were worried because we had borrowed on it 
and we had enough to do with payments on the 
farm, and we couldn't see how we could make such 
a payment. 
Q. Then, the purpose for going in was to stop making 
payments? 
A. We couldn't make any payments. 
Q. You wanted to make arrangements so that you 
wouldn't have to make any further payments? 
A. Yes:· 
R. 30 
Mr. Erich Olschewski, on direct examination, testified: 
"Q. In connection with this policy, did you have occa-
sion during the year of 195 5 to see Alma M. Page 
at your office? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what month it was? 
A. August. 
Q. And who was with him? 
A. His wife." 
R. 35 
At this point it is important to recognize that this policy 
was paid by a single premium each year of $400.00 (R. 46), 
payable on the anniversary date of the policy which was De-
cember 15 of each year (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). The premium 
due on December 15, 1954, had been paid by a policy loan 
and the policy was in full force and effect with no additional 
premium due until December 15, 1955 (R. 54), which date 
was over four months in the future from the time of the con· 
18 
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versations testified to by Ruth Jensen Page and Mr. Olschewski, 
and corroborated by Exhibits 3, 4, 10 and 12. 
Defendant's Exhibit 10 corroborates the testimony of 
Ruth Jenesn Page in regard to the desire of her husband, the 
insured, to apply for one of the options available to him 
under the policy. 
"I have looked into the matter discussed as to the 
alternatives available and advisable in applying the 
non-forfeiture values of your policy. 
"Again I'm sorry that you feel that you are unable to 
continue with this full program." 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 10 
Ltr, dtd Aug. 3, 195 5, from 
Defendant to Insured. 
The evidence was uncontroverted that the insured, Alma 
M. Page, went to the insurance company offices of his own 
free will four months prior to the expiration of his policy of 
insurance. The evidence and testimony established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that his motive in going there was to do 
something about his insurance policy. From the evidence ad-
duced the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the insured 
intended to elect one of the three options available under his 
policy of insurance. 
POINT FOUR 
DID THE INSURED, ALMA M. PAGE, PRIOR TO 
HIS DEATH, ELECT "OPTION (B) REDUCED PAID-UP 
LIFE INSURANCE," UNDER THE NON-FORFEITURE 
PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY IN QUESTION? 
19 
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The evidence introduced in this matter established, and 
was not controverted, that the insured and his wife, Ruth 
Jensen Page, visited the office of the insurance company shortly 
prior to August 3rd, 1955, and again on the 8th day of August, 
1955 (R. 20, 21, 35, 37, and Defendant's Exhibits 10 and 12). 
It is important to note that the testimony of the insured's 
widow, Ruth Jensen Page, while uncertain as to the unimportant 
details (unimportant, at least, to the insured and his wife at 
the time of the transaction) , is positive as to what the insured 
decided to do with regard to the election of one of the options 
available to him under the provisions of the policy. 
The plaintiffs attempted to capitalize upon these uncer-
tainties in her testimony, but it should be remembered that 
over two years had elapsed between the time the visits were 
made to the offices. of the defendant insurance company and 
the election made of one of the options and the time her 
testimony was given. The uncertainty as to detail is only normal 
and lends itself to the belief of her testimony. How many of 
us can recall the details of transactions two years old? 
Ruth Jensen Page testified: 
"Q. Now, after you received this letter, did you and 
your husband discuss about the life insurance?" 
(The letter referred to is Defendant's Exhibit 10, 
Ltr Dated August 3rd, 1955.) 
"A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you do afterward, if anything? 
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"Q. This gentleman here? And do you recall what was 
said at that time to Erich?" (Referring to the sec-
ond visit made by the insured and Mrs. Page to the 
company offices.) 
"THE COURT: That calls for a yes or no answer. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, what was it? 
A. Can I answer it? 
Q: You don't have to give us word for word, just the 
substance as far as you can remember. What recol-
lection you have as to what your husband and you 
said? 
A. We just told him what we wanted and he still tried 
to ask us to stay on, but ... 
Q. What did you say you wanted? 
A. A paid up insurance. 
Q. A paid up insurance ... " 
R. 24 
"Q. Now, will you tell us what you received from the 
Insurance Company through the mails? 
A. I said I thought we received a piece of paper with 
the insurance saying that it was paid up insurance." 
R. 25 
"Q. Did you and your husband talk about it, the in-
surance policy, after it came back from the Insur-
ance Company? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. At no time? 
A. I saw the paper that I thought was with it. I don't 
know if it was attached. 
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Q. Where was the paper which you saw? 
A. With the insurance when it came back." 
R. 26 
"Q. Now, after this policy came back, did you and 
your husband discuss the insurance policy? 
A. No, not after it was fixed the way we wanted it." 
R. 27 
On cross-examination, Ruth Jensen Page testified: 
"Q. Do you remember honestly reading or receiving 
the exhibit which is marked No. 12? 
A. As I said, not the ~ordings, but I remember talking 
that it was fixed the way we wanted it when the 
policy came back.'' 
R. 29 
"Q. Can you explain the ways which Mr. Olschewski 
arranged the policy so that you wouldn't have to 
make any more payments? 
A. No, I'm not quite sure. I know that we decided to 
take the paid up insurance. I can't recall the differ-
ent ways.'' 
R. 31 
The witness, Ruth Jensen Page, was asked one question 
on re-direct examination: 
"Q. Mrs. Page, do you remember the amount of m-
surance on the paid-up insurance policy? 
A. One thousand four hundred something." 
R. 32 
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page was never impeached 
by either her own testimony or by the testimony of any other 
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witness. She stands as an independent and disinterested party 
who has nothing to gain or lose in this law suit; and, as the 
person who was closest to the deceased insured, certainly 
knows what transpired and what the insured elected to do. 
The plaintiffs never did discredit the honesty or veracity of 
this witness. Her testimony, while uncertain as to detail, stands 
firm and positive as to the elected option of the deceased 
insured. 
"Though a witness is uncertain as to either the ob-
servation or the recollection of a fact concerning which 
he is asked to testify, and gives his testimony qualified 
by a phrase or phrases expressive of something less 
than a positive degree of assurance, the admissibility 
of his evidence is not affected thereby." 
4 A.L.R. 979, annotation, 
Citing cases 
"Generally, testimony given by a disinterested wit-
ness, who is in no way discredited by other evidence, 
to a fact within his own knowledge, which is not in 
itself improbable or in conflict with other evidence, is 
to be believed; and in many cases it is said that the 
facts so given are to be taken as legally established." 
20 Am Jur 1030, Evidence, 
Sec. 1180, citing cases. 
Sec. 8 A.L.R. 796 annotation 
Jones, Commentaries on evidence, 
Vol. 6, P. 4887, Sec. 2467 
"Unless the witness is impeached or his testimony is 
against the ordinary and usual course of nature, or for 
some other adequate reason is clearly not worthy of 
belief, the courts are bound to consider it in arriving 
at their conclusions." 
Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Fox, 
44 U. 323, 140 P. 660, 663. 
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·'While juries are given great latitude in deducing 
inferences from established facts, they, n~vertheless, 
are not permitted to base an inference upon an infer-
ence. Nor may they, without any reason overturn legal 
presumptions or arbitrarily disregard the positive state-
ments of witnesses . . . If juries were permitted to do 
that, then court trials and the rules of evidence would 
become a mere delusion and a snare." 
Karren v. Blair, 63 U 344 
225 P. 1094, 1096 
"Under usual circumstances uncontroverted testi-
mony of credible witnesses may not arbitrarily be dis-
regarded by the trier of facts." 
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 
5 U. 2d 187, 299 P. 2d 622. 
"However, where facts are proved by uncontroverted 
testimony of competent disinterested witnesses and 
there is nothing inherently unreasonable nor any cir-
cumstances which would tend to raise doubt of its 
truth, it should be taken as established. Refusal to do 
so is an arbitrary disregard by the trier of the facts." 
Citing authority. 
Jones v. California Packing Corp., 
121 U. 612, 244 P. 2d 640. 
Defendant's Exhibit 12 was never directly assailed as being 
fraudulent nor as having been written at a later date than as 
shown on the letter. 
Defendant's Exhibit 3, which was received in evidence, 
states, in the handwriting of Mr. Erich Olschewski: 
"8-8-55 - Elected Paid-Up for $1443.00." 
Def's Exhibit 3, 
Policy Data Sheet from 
Records of Defendant company 
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Mr. Olschewski testified that he placed this wntmg on 
the sheet, or card, at the time that the insured and his . Yiife 
were in his office on the 8th day of August, 195 5, and elected 
to take the paid-up insurance (R. 39) . He further testified 
that the notation in red pencil, "Reduced Paid-Up," which 
appears on this card was likewise placed thereon by him at this 
time (R. 40), and that the red penciled notation, "Reduced 
Paid-Up," which appears on Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 4, 
the premium record card and the dividend record card, re-
spectively, kept by the defendant with regard to the policy 
in question, were made by him at that time (R. 40, 41) . 
Defendant's Exhibit 4, the dividend record card, shows 
the dividends, both bonus and participating, which were paid 
on this policy. It is to be noted that prior to the dividend pay-
ment made on December 15, 1955, none of the bonus dividends 
or participating dividends were ever less than $20.00. The last 
two bonus dividends were for $48.99 and $56.00, respectively, 
and the participating dividend paid December 15, 1954, was 
for $36.33. 
Defendant's Exhibit 9, a dividend check made payable to 
the insured, Alma M. Page, dated December 22, 1955, and 
showing endorsements and clearing house stamps dated Janu-
ary 11, 1956, shows that the amount paid for participating 
dividends in the year 1955 was only $4.75. 
During the years 1950 through 1954, the face amount 
of the policy was $11,682.00. However, prior to the anniversary 
of the policy in December of 1955, defendant contends, the 
policy was reduced in face amount to only $1,443.00, thus 
accounting for the reduction in participating dividend from 
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$36.33 paid December 15, 1954, to $4.75 paid December 15, 
1955. 
The dividend check for $4.75, Defendant's Exhibit 9, was 
notice to Alma M. Page of the change in the face amount of 
his policy, and the fact that the insured accepted the check 
and did not contest the obviously drastic reduction in dividends 
shows that he well knew of the reduction in the face amount 
of his policy. 
"But when insured was, after repeated notice, in· 
formed that the policy had been indorsed for $1,955.00 
term insurance and the length of that term and of this 
application of the dividends accrued he took no steps 
to indicate any dissent or objection to what had been 
done . . . This brings up the question whether he did 
not consent to or acquiese in, all that is involved in the 
indorsement on the policy. We think it should be said 
that he did.'' 
Dougherty v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 
of N.Y., (226 MA 570) 44 S.W. 2d 206. 
Cited with approval in Scutten v. 
Metro Life Ins. Co., 68 S.W. 2d 60, 
retrial, 81 S.W. 2d 313. 
The plaintiffs attempted at great length to discredit De-
fendant's Exhibit No. 3. the policy data sheet, as being con-
tradictory of other exhibits and of what the company did with 
regard to the election made by the insured. Plaintiffs' counsel 
pointed out that the notation, "Lapsed 9-16-55," on the bottom 
of Exhibit No. 3, was contrary to the notation, "8-8-55 Elected 
Paid-Up for $1443.00,'' appearing in the upper portion of 
the exhibit and to defendant's proposed Exhibit 6, a report 
to the reinsurance company, wherein it is shown that the Page 
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policy lapsed on "7-15-55." An examination of Exhibit 6 shows 
that the date of this report is September 16, 1955, the same 
date appearing on the bottom of Exhibit 3. 
In regard to the report to the reinsurance company, the 
proposed Exhibit 6, Mr. Olschewski testified: 
"THE COURT: ... Ask him if he can explain why the 
word 'lapsed' was used. 
Q. Can you? 
A. Yes. To notify them to discontinue his reinsurance 
premium payments. 
Q. All right. And that is the meaning of the word 
'lapsed' as far as this report is concerned? 
A. Yes." 
R. 71, 72 
Plaintiffs attempted to confuse the jury by trying to show 
inconsistencies in the defendant's records introduced as exhibits, 
but the testimony of the defendant's secretary, Mr. Olschewski, 
explained the entries. The court erred in not allowing the 
introduction of Defendant's Exhibit No. 6, on the grounds that 
this exhibit explained entries on Exhibit No. 3. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Under Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is per-
mitted for either party to an action to move for a directed 
verdict upon the close of the evidence offered by the opponent. 
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Upon the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the defendant moved 
the court for a directed verdict (R. 115) on the grounds that 
as a matter of law, as the defendant had met the burden of 
proof and the plaintiffs had not introduced competent evidence 
to rebut defendant's evidence, there was no question of fact 
to be decided by the jury and any deliberation by them would 
be speculative in nature. 
The defendant had established beyond any doubt the 
insured's election of one of the options contained in the policy 
of insurance. As a matter of law, this election fixed the rights 
of the parties. 
·'The offer is contained in the policy contract, and 
is from the company to the insured; the option is in 
the insured and not the company, and his acceptance 
completes the contract; the company has no right to 
accept or reject; its obligation to pay is absolute ... 
The cases, as far as we are advised, are at one in hold-
ing that the rights of the parties are fixed when an 
option given by a policy is exercised by the insured." 
Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bryce, 67 F. 2d 710 (lOth Cir. 
1933) 91 A.L.R. 1446. 
The above case cites the case of Lipman v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Society, 58 F. 2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1932), wherein the 
Court stated: 
·'Since the insured had the option to surrender her 
policy and take the cash surrender value on October 
1Oth, there can be no question but that the rights of 
the parties became fixed and insured became entitled 
to the cash surrender value, and nothing more, when 
she exercised the option. It was not necessary that 
defendant do anything. There was a meeting of the 
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minds of the parties when the insured accepted the 
continuing offer of the company evidenced by the 
option.'' 
The election by the insured of the option made the instant 
case a matter of law and not a matter of fact for the jury to 
speculate upon. The court acknowledged this by its Instruction 
No. 8, wherein it instructed the jury: 
"You are instructed that delivery of the policy of 
insurance to the insurance company by the insured, 
with request that it issue to him a reduced paid-up life 
insurance policy constitutes an election." 
As set forth in Points 1, 3, and 4 of this brief, the evidence 
established that the insured did surrender his policy, did request 
information about the options, and did elect "Reduced Paid-
Up" insurance. 
Barron and Holtzoff, in their work, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 754, Sec. 1071, said: 
"It is a well established principle of the common 
law that although questions of fact must be decided 
by the jury and may not be reexamined by the court, 
the question whether there is sufficient evidence to 
raise a question of fact to be presented to the jury is 
a question of law to be decided by the court." 
In the case now before the court, the plaintiffs introduced 
no evidence by testimony or otherwise which directly rebutted 
defendant's evidence that the insured did in fact deliver his 
policy to the company and did elect to take "Reduced Paid-Up" 
insurance. 
"Where the evidence upon any issue is all on one 
side or so overwhelming on one side as to leave no 
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room for doubt what the fact is, the court should give 
a preemptory instruction to the jury." Citing cases. 
Coen v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 
120 F. 2d 393 (8th Cir. 1941). 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 
288 U.S. 333, 53 S. Ct. 391, 
77 L. Ed. 819. 
"In the Federal courts where the evidence in favor 
of one party is so overwhelming that the judge in the 
exercise of sound discretion would be obliged to grant 
a new trial if the jury rendered a verdict in favor of 
the other party, it is his duty to direct a verdict." Citing 
cases of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 
333, 53 S. Ct. 391, 77 L. Ed 819; Daroca v. Metro-
politan Life Ins Co., et al, CCA 5th, 121 F. 2d 919. 
" . . . the rule of practice to the effect that a mere 
scintella of evidence is sufficient to require submission 
to the jury has never obtained in the Federal Courts." 
White v. New York Life Ins Co., 
145 F. 2d 504 (5th Cir. 1944). 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT. 
The defendant moved the court for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and, in the alternative, a motion for a new 
trial (R. 125). Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure such 
a motion is proper, and the court, while having denied a 
motion for a directed verdict, may enter judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
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.. ' . . . that because the court cannot direct a verdict 
one way, it may not set aside a verdict the other way 
is erroneous. Indeed, as distinctly pointed out by Judge 
Lurton, the mental process in deciding a motion to 
direct a verdict is very different from that used in de-
ciding a motion to set aside a verdict as against the 
weight of evidence. In the former there is no weighing 
of plaintiff's evidence with defendant's. It is only a 
sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to support a burden 
ignoring defendant's evidence. In the latter it is 
always a comparison of opposing proofs.' " 
General America Life Ins. Co. v. 
Central Nat'l Bank, 136 F. 2d 821, 823 
(6th Cir. 1943), Citing Felton v. Spiro, 
78 F. 2d 576,582 (6th Cir. 1897). 
Barron and Holtzoff in their work, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 774, Sec. 1079, have stated: 
"The court has power to enter judgment notwith-
standing the verdict only for one reason-the absence 
of any substantial evidence to sup_port the verdict.'' 
The annotation on "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict," found in United States Supreme Court Reports, 
85 L. Ed. 155, 311 U.S., gives the background and basis for 
such a motion. 
In the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 
F. 2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941), the court goes into the historical 
background and examines many of the cases on the subject. 
The court ruled: 
"In such a motion" (to set aside the verdict) "it is 
the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant 
a new trial if he is of opinion that the verdict is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon 
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evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage 
of justice even though there may be substantial evi-
dence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." 
In the instant case, the weight of the evidence was over-
whelmingly in favor of the defendant, and on the basis of 
this weight the court properly should have granted defendant's 
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The court, in its instruction No. 9, stated: 
"The burden is upon the defendant insurance com-
pany to prove to your satisfaction by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that at about the time indicated above 
in this instruction, the insured, Alma M. Page, did 
elect to change the policy referred to in paragraph 
one of this instruction, that he notified the insurance 
company of such election, and that the company did 
make the change in the policy . . . '' 
The defendant, as shown in Points No. 1, 3 and 4, did 
overwhelmingly prove all of the elements enumerated in this 
instruction. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in the case of 
Bentley v. Brossard et al, 33 U. 396, 94 P. 737, held: 
"Instructions to a jury are the law of the case, which 
the jury must follow whether the instructions are in 
fact correct; and, where a verdict is in disregard of 
instructions, it should be set aside by the trial court." 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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The defendant made a motion for a new trial _ in the 
alternative to its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict (R. 125 ), and stated the grounds for the motion. 
In the case of Garrison v. United States, 62 F. 2d 41 (4th 
Cir. ) the court pointed out: 
"Verdict may be set aside and new trial granted, 
when the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of 
the evidence, or whenever in the exercise of sound 
discretion the trial judge thinks this action necessary 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice." 
In the case now before the· court, the clear weight of the 
evidence favored the defendant and upon the court's decision 
not to grant a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, it should have granted a new trial. The refusal 
to do so was error and an abuse of the court's sound discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs, by introducing the policy of insurance on 
the life of the deceased insured, with no rider attached to the 
policy showing that the policy had been reduced to paid-up 
life insurance established a prima facie case, and the burden 
fell upon the defendant to prove that the insured had, prior 
to his death in 1956, elected the option of reduced paid-up 
insurance. 
The defendant successfully met this burden and estab-
lished, by not only a preponderance of evidence but by the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence, that the insured had, 
prior to his death, (a) intended to elect one of the options 
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under the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy, (b) delivered 
his insurance policy to the defendant insurance company, and 
(c) elected "Option (B) Reduced Paid-Up Life Insurance" 
under the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy in question. 
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, the widow of the 
insured, the testimony of the defendant's employees, and the 
documentary evidence introduced by the defendant established 
the defendant's claim beyond a reasonable doubt; and there-
fore: 
1. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict, on the ground that the plaintiffs did not 
introduce sufficient evidence rebutting defendant's evidence to 
merit the submission of the matter to a jury. 
2. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that the 
verdict was not in accordance with the weight of evidence. 
3. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for 
a new trial, on the ground that a manifest injustice was done 
by not giving defendant an opportunity to have this matter 
heard before another jury. 
On the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial, defendant 
is entitled to judgment in its favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 10 
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY 
NEWHOUSE BUILDING 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
August 3, 1955 
Mr. and Mrs. Alma M. Page 
Riverton 
Utah 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Page: 
I have looked into the matter discussed as to the alterna-
tives available and advisable in applying the non-forfeiture 
values of your policy. 
Again I'm sorry that you feel that you are unable to con-
tinue with this full program. As explained to you before, there 
is a considerable forfeiture by discontinuing this contract at 
this juncture. While if you see the program through, it will 
prove very profitable to your investment besides the insurance 
coverage. However, I assume that you are giving this your care-
ful consideration. 
One option available is the reduced paid-up insurance as 
we discussed, and if this option is elected at this time, we can 
offer you a paid-up policy for the amount of $1443.00. 
Another choice is to reissue your policy in two separate 
policies in such amounts as would make it convenient for you 
to keep one of them in force and permit the other to lapse 
with the privilege of reinstating it when convenient. 
You may, of course, surrender your policy completely for 
its present cash value. You have paid five annual premiums, 
the last annual premium paid by a policy loan. The cash values 
at the end of the fifth year, which will be December 15, 1955, 
come to $71.00 per $1,000 face amount or a total of $829.42 
minus the present loan against the policy of $421.05. 
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Of these three propositions we recommend either of the 
first two mentioned, and we hope to hear from you as to your 
decision. 
We remind you again that this policy is a very unusual and 
exclusive Bonus Contract. I note that dividends have already 
been totaling $210.45 which needless to say is a very liberal 
and gratifying percentage, and which dividends would con-
tinue and undoubtedly increase yearly in proportion to the 
premium amount continued. 
We shall continue to hold your policy in our possession 
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Mr. Alma M. Page 
Riverton, Utah 
Dear Mr. Page: 
EXHIBIT 12 
August 15, 1955 
In accordance with your election when in the office on 
August 8, we return herewith your policy No. 20 PLB-3101. 
Please note that we have attached thereto our endorsement 
certifying that we have applied the Paid-Up Option for the face 
amount of $1,443, being effective as of August 8, 1955. 
Your contract is now fully paid-up and will not require 
any further premium payments. Dividends will continue in 
proportion to the reduced face amount as set forth in the pro-
visions of the policy. 
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